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International Law and Interstate
River Disputes
William W. Van Alstyne*
MAY of this year a Special Master for the United States Supreme Court
I reported
certain determinations which may well be critical to the future
N

development of Arizona and California.1 His report climaxed a thirty-year
dispute involving the rights of these states to the millions of acre feet of
water which flow through the Colorado River each year.2 The Master's
particular findings have been viewed as assuring the future growth of Arizona while committing California to a multibillion dollar canal system to
avoid serious water shortages in arid southern California within ten years.8
Similar disputes involving interstate rivers have occupied the Court's
attention during the past thirty years/ and with the demands expected to
be made on natural waterways by the burgeoning western populace/ we
may expect a recurrence of such contests in the future. This is particularly
likely due to the absence of clear and suitable standards having been promulgated by the Court in the past. The fact is that nonstatutory federal law
relevant to the apportionment of interstate rivers is scanty and uneven,6
providing few guides to states concerned with the diversion of interstate
rivers for internal uses. Moreover, the states have not been free to rely on
the application of their own water law as binding on other quasi-sovereign
*Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State University. B.A., University
of Southern California, 1955; LL.B., Stanford University, 1958.
lNew York Times, May 9, 1960, p.1, col.1, and p.24, cols.1-ll.
For a lengthy case history of thirty years, sec citations to Arizona. v. California in Th~
Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REv. 665, 716 (1959).
8 See, e.g., the paraphrase of Governor Brown's remark that the decision "underscored
the importance of the proposed $1,750,000,000 Feather River Project for bringing water from
ruoist northern California some 500 miles to the arid south." N.Y. Times, May 9, 1960, p. 24,
cols.S-6.
4 Texas v. New Mexico, 343 U.S. 932 (1952), dismissed for want of an indispensable party,
352 U.S. 991 (1957); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Colorado v. Kansas, 320
U.S. 383 (1943); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936); Nevr Jersey v. New York,
283 U.S. 336 (1931); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Wisconsin v. Dlinois, 281 U.S.
179 (1929); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931). For a full chronology of these
and other interstate water cases, see 11 STAN. L. REv. 708-19 (1959).
IS Unofficial census returns for 1960 indicate that Nevada, Arizona, and California are among
the five fastest growing states, with percentage gains since 1950 of 75%, 71% and 46%, respectively. California has added nearly five million new residents since 1950. See N.Y. Times,
June 17, 1960, p. 54, cols. 5-7.
6 See cases cited in note 4 supra, and compare Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907),
with Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
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states,1 nor have they always been able to rely on congressional declarations, for none of general application are to be found.
For want of better authority, the Supreme Court has suggested that
some useful guides may be derived from international law. Thus, it has
reserved the right to analogize disputing states to quasi-sovereign nations
and to apply appropriate rules of international law in resolving the issues.
In the first significant interstate river case the Supreme Court observed:
Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a domestic tribunal, we
apply Federal law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the
particular case may demand.8
Nor is our jurisdiction ousted, even if, because Kansas and Colorado are
States sovereign and independent in local matters, the relations between
them depend in any respect upon principles of international law. International law is no alien in this tribunal.9

What internationallaw.the Court was talking about and just how this law
may be helpful continue to be matters of speculation; as yet, no interstate
river dispute has actually been decided on the basis of such authority.
These dicta are somewhat tantalizing under the circumstances, however,
and since the Court has elsewhere made use of international law in its deliberations,10 it may not be presumptuous to explore the relevance of international law to interstate rivers in this article. But before embarking on
that undertaking, it may first be well to understand what "international
law'' we are talking about.

I
SOURCES AND AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The usual sources of international law to be considered are those prescribed for the International Court of Justice, in article 38 of its statute:
'l See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 74, 95 (1907); Connecticut v. Massachusetts,
282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 599, 618 (1945). Consider, too,
the Court's remark in Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 144 (1902): "Comity demanded that
navigable rivers should be free, and therefore the freedom of the Mississippi, the Rhine, the
Scheidt, the Danube, the St. Lawrence, the Amazon, and other rivers has been at different times
secured by treaty; but if a State of this Union deprives another State of its rights in a navigable stream, and Congress has not regulated the subject, as no treaty can be made between
them, how is the matter to be adjusted?"
8 Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146 (1902).
9 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907). See also Connecticut v. Massachusetts,
282 u.s. 660, 670 (1931).
10 See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900): "International law is part of
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination." See also The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815); The Peterhoff,
72 U.S. 28, 57 (1866); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); The Over The Top, 5 F.2d 838
(D. Conn. 1925).
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The court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly-recognized by the contesting states;
b. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions, and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
It will be noticed that article 38 relegates the teachings of publicists to
the category of subsidiary means for determining international law-a considerable understatement in fact, since the International Court, "as distinguished from dissenting or separate opinions of individual Judges, [has
never] found it necessary to refer to the writings of a single author as
representing the 'teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations.' " 11 Since, however, our immediate concern is with the applicability of international river law to interstate cases, it is significant that
the Supreme Court, in contrast to the International Court, has given considerable weight to the declarations of international law publicists: "Such
works [i.e., the works of international law publicists], are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what
the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really
is. 1112 And elsewhere, the Court has remarked that it "must follow the lights
of reason and the lessons of the masters of international jurisprudence.1113
Considerable attention in this article will therefore be devoted to the position taken by various publicists as to the principles of international law
relating to the diversion of rivers.
On the other hand, the difficulty in relying upon judicial decisions as
suggested by article 38 raises a more substantial problem. For not only are
such decisions merely secondary authority14 (the more so since the International Court has not adopted the principle of stare decisis),15 but in fact
neither the International Court nor its predecessor, the Permanent Court,
have ever decided a contest involving international fluvial diversions.
Judicial material on international river diversions is confined to a spate
of ad hoc commission decisions, certain mediation efforts, and a very few
11 LAUTERPACHT, TH£ DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 23 (1958).
12The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113
(1895).

13The Peterhoff, 72 U.S. 28, 57 (1866). For examples of the Court's reference to international publicists, see New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934); Missouri v. Dlinois,
200

u.s. 496, 520 (1906).

14 STAT. !NT'L CT. JuST., art. 38, para. l(d).
1li STAT. !NT'L CT. JusT., art. 59.
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decisions handed down by municipal tribunals where jurisdiction has been
assumed over certain rights of foreign sovereigns or, in proper analogy to
Arizona v. California, over rights of "quasi-sovereigns" within a federation.16 This meager authority will not be found to be especially persuasive.
In considering the use of treaties which are relevant under article 38
both as examples of general "international conventions" which establish
a rule governing the signatory powers and as evidence of "international
custom," the problem is assuredly not one of too little material. Rather, the
problem is to determine the proper relevance of treaties to international
custom in view of the following provocative questions:
1. Does the fact that nations have stipulated rules of conduct by treaty
indicate that international custom is being followed?
2. Does it indicate, rather, that the parties have deliberately departed
from a customary rule of conduct for the reason that customary international law would have prescribed a different rule?
3. Does it merely illustrate that international customary law is sufficiently undeveloped or ambiguous on this subject that some stipulation is
needed for convenience?
There appears to be no convincing answer, for as Judge Lauterpacht
of the International Court has remarked:
[N] o simple rule can solve the difficulty inherent in the question whether
uniform treaties recognising obligations on the part of the successor State
merely give more specific expression to the general customary principle of
State succession or on the contrary, whether they are constitutive of obligations which but for their express regulation would not exist at all; or
whether the frequent, almost uniform, provisions of treaties . . . are evidence of, or-by implication--deny the existence of a customary rule on
the subject.U

Compare these observations by Professor Pollack on the same point:
[Treaties] ... may go to show, according to the nature of the case and
the particular circumstances, the existence of a general usage which the
parties wished to record for convenience in apt words and an authentic
form (though this is not common), or the dissatisfaction of the parties with
existing usage and their desire to improve on it, or the absence of any
settled usage at all antecedent to the particular agreement. It is, therefore,
impracticable ... to make any general statement as to the value of treaties
and similar instruments as evidence of the law of nations.18

But even should we assume that treaties articulating a common rule of
conduct may evidence customary international practice, it may be something else again to assert that widespread adherence to such a rule has
16 See text at footnotes
17 LAUTEJU'ACHT,

THE

66-72, 101-02 infra.
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT 377-79 (1958).
18 Pollock, The Sources of International Law, 2 CoLUM. L. REv. 511 (1902).
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created a law of "international custom" within article 38. With some oppositionr several notable writers have maintained that customary law requires something more than adherence to a common rule from notions of
convenience or expediency; to receive the impress of law, a common practice may have had to meet a further requirement of opinio necessitatis
juris, i.e., it must have been adopted from a sense of juridical obligation or
duty. As Charles Fenwick describes the evolution of customary international law:
Rules of customary law have bad their origin in the practice of a single
state or of a group of states; then in time other states have been led from
various motives to adopt the same practice until a well-defined usage has
grown up, which in its tum bas slowly hardened into fixed custom carrying
with it a recognition that t!te practice is no longer voluntary but of obli-

gation.20
Or, to revert to Lauterpacht:

[O]pinio necessitatis juris [requires] ... consciousne!;s that the conduct,
frequently or constantly pursued, is due to the existence of a sense of legal
obligation or at least of the will to undertake a legal obligation.21
Since, however, it may often be an insuperable burden to prove that a sense
of legal obligation motivated a nation to arrive at a particular agreement,
Judge Lauterpacht neatly rescues the authority of 1miform international
practice by asserting that a rebuttable presumption arises that the element
of obligation is present once a certain practice is established as being frequent and widespread.22 Professor Schwarzenberger arrives at about the
same place; although he maintains that a sense of obligation is required to
prove customary international law, a general practice in the absence of such
a feeling may still be some evidence of a "general principle of international
law" and is at least persuasive authority under the ex aequo clause of the
International Court statute when parties have agreed to be governed by
broader notions of fairness. 23 It remains true, however, that "the two great
difficulties with respect to custom are (1) the difficulty of proof, and (2)
the difficulty of determining at what stage custom can be said to become
authoritative."24
For these several reasons, any writer's description of the customary
191 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 10 (2d ed. 1945), implies that r.omeU1ing less than a sense
of obligation will do. See also Hudson, Working Paper on Customm·y International Law, U.N.
Doc. A/CN/4/16 (1950), suggesting that a sense of consistency with international practice is
an alternative to a sense of requirement by international practice.
lWFENWicx, INiERNATIONAL LAw 62-63 (2d ed. 1934). (Emphasis added.) See also
1 OPPENHEIMER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (9th ed. 1948).
21 LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL
CoURT 379 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
22]d. at 380.
23 SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 39-49 (3d ed. 1957).
24CoBBETT, CASEs AND OPINIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (3d ed.1909).
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international law of a given subject should be regarded reservedly. With
respect to the use of water from international rivers, moreover, the problem
is not merely one of resolving the authority of available materials; it also
embraces the fundamental difficulty of establishing continuity in the treatment of this subject on the basis of the orthodox indicia of international
law. A consensus of writers holds, with good reason, that this area of the
law is still in a formative condition and that no clear rule has yet emerged
to sanction a particular means of apportioning the use of international
river water. The 1952 Report of the Economic Commission for Europe
contains a judicious appraisal of the writings of many international law
publicists on this subject and concludes:
Most of the authors recognize that State sovereignty must be limited but
their ideas as to the extent of and reasons for such limitations differ
widely.25
[T]hese theories fail to withstand critical analysis, and their very diversity adds to the confusion.26
We ourselves shall make no attempt to construct a theory concerning the
hydro-electric development of waters of common interest on the sole bases
of purely legal concepts, as this would, we consider, be so much wasted
effort.27

In 1931, H. A. Smith canvassed the little material then available on the
use of international river water, observing:
For the most part the leading textbooks have little or nothing to say upon
the subject ....26
[The case of Wyoming v. Colorado] ... serves to illustrate ... that there
is really no general rule of law wh'ich can be applied indiscriminately to all
disputes that may arise.29

Brierly expresses the same feeling in stating:
The law relating to . . . uses of rivers [other than for navigation], and
indeed the customary law relating to rivers generally, is still in an early
stage of development, for the problems ... are of recent growth.30
It is probable that in the absence of a treaty there is no rule of law in this
matter.31
25RuoRT OF THE UNITED NATIONS EcoNOMIC CoMMissiON :roR EUROPE, UN. Doc. No.
E/ECE/136 at 85 (1952) [hereinafter cited as ECE REPORT].
26Jd. at 93.
27 !d. at 94.
28 SMITH, Tm: EcoNOMIC USES o:r INTERNATIONAL RivERs 154 (1931) [hereinater cited
as SMITH].
29Jd. at 87.
80 BRIERLY, Tm: LAW OF NATIONS 204 (5th ed. 1955).
81 BRIERLY, Tm: LAw OF NATIONS 129 (1928).
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Professor Clyde Eagleton, who has several times reviewed the status of
international rivers, candidly concedes that "except for navigation, little
attention has been said to the international law for rivers." 32 In 1957, Professor Schwarzenberger pointed up the rudimentary state of the law in
observing:
It is controversial whether international customary law or general prin-

ciples of law recognized by civilised nations impose any restraint on states
regarding rivers which traverse the territories of several States.... [U] ntil
more convincing evidence of the existence of restrictive rules of international customary law or general principles of law recognised by civilised
nations is forthcoming, the term international rivers must be reserved to
rivers, whether, in a geographical sense, national, binational, or multinational, the regime of which is the subject of international treaties.33
Charles de Visscher has explained that "periodic attempts to unify the law
have not been too successful," because European waterways have traditionally been involved in problems of navigation which raise considerations
quite different from those present in American disputes more commonly
involving the appropriation of interstate waters for irrigation.34 At least
token judicial support for these cautious appraisals of international water
law issued from the Imperial Administrative Court of Austria (the high
municipal tribunal of Austria), in 1913:
[W] e have not pased beyond the postulate of the mutual and fair consideration of the contiguous states through which the river takes its course;
and ... opinions still widely differ regarding the extent to and the form in
which this consideration should be applied ....35
Thus, it should be acknowledged that "as regards the right of a riparian
state to use, obstruct, or divert boundary waters, international law is obscure."36 For this reason, as for others going to the doubtful weight of the
sources of international law, the materials which follow are offered with
considerable diffidence.37
32Eagleton, The Use of the Waters of International Rivers, 33 CAN. B. REv. 1018 (1955).
33 ScHw.ARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 218 (3d ed. 1957).
34 DE VISSCHER, Tm:oRIES ET REA:r.nn:s EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBUC 260-65 (2d ed.
1955).
351 HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 595 (1940).
36 MacKay, The International Joint Commission Between the United States and Canada,
22 AM:.J. INT'LL. 292,295 (1928). See also BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
298 (1953) j 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 563 (2d ed. 1945) j SmsARIAN, THE DIVERSION OF
INTERNATIONAL WATERS 99 (1939) j KAECKENBEECK, INTERNATIONAL RlvEllS 181 (1918) j Austin,
A Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 CAN. B. REv. 393, 399 (1939).
37 For an argument that apportionment of international rivers involves too many variables to make any statement of principles desirable, see BRIERLY, THE OuTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAw 42-43 (1944); REPORT OF THE NILE CoMMISSION in 130 BRITISH AND FoREIGN
STATE PAPERS 112 (1929) [hereinafter cited as BR. ST. P.].
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II
THREE THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE DIVERSION OF RIVERS

A. That a State has an Absolute Right to All Waters Within Its
Territorial Jurisdiction
That a state has absolute dominion over all water within its territory
relies, of course, upon the rubric of national sovereignty. First popularized
in the United States by Attorney General Judson Harmon,38 the doctrine
states that:
[T]here is no duty or obligation in international law on any state to restrain its use of the waters within its territory to accommodate the needs
of another state. Jurisdiction and control of a state over the waters of an
international river wholly in its territory is exclusive.39
Not entirely by coincidence, the Attorney General asserted this position
when it served American imperial interests to do so. In 1895, the Government of Mexico protested diversions of water from the Rio Grande River
then being made on the American side of the border.40 The complaint
alleged that serious injuries had resulted to existing domestic and agricultural uses of the water in Mexico and claimed that Mexico's interest in the
river with respect to future developments had been prejudiced as well.
While the United States subsequently agreed to guarantee Mexico a certain
minimum interest in the river, it did so in a Convention which expressly
disavowed any recognition of Mexican rights as a matter of international
law:
The delivery of water as herein provided is not to be construed as a recognition by the United States of any claim on the part of Mexico to said
waters.41
In 1929, when the American Section of the International Water Commission convened to reconsider certain minimum guarantees to Mexico, it
restated that no acknowledgment of Mexican rights as a matter of interas For a recent discussion, see Austin, A Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon
Doctrine, 37 CAN. B. REv. 393 (1959).
39 I d. at 408.
40 The undeveloped state of international law at the time is attested by reliance of the
Mexican Minister on civil, rather than international, law. See SIMsARIAN, Tm: DIVERSION OF
INTERNATIONAL RivERs 44 (1939).
41 Art. IV, Rio Grande Convention of 1906, 1 MALLOY, ThEATIES, CoNVENTIONs, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERicA AND
Orm:R PoWERS 1202, 1203 (1910). See also Article V, providing that: "The United States, in
entering into this treaty, does not thereby concede, expressly or by implication, any legal basis
for any claims heretofore asserted ... by reason of any losses incurred by the owners of land
in Mexico ••. nor does the United States in any way concede the establishment of any general
principle or precedent by the concluding of this treaty."
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national law was intended.42 And in 1939 a writer was safe in observing
that:
The United States has maintained consistently in negotiations with Mexico
that there is no limitation in international law on the right of a state to
divert the waters of a river while it is wholly within its territory, before
the river enters another state or forms the boundary line between that
state and another state.48

The doctrine has received mild support from a few publicists such as
Briggs, who has written:
In the absence of [a special conventional regime between States] . . •
national rivers and those portions of international rivers which are within
the national territory are subject to the exclusive control of the territorial
sovereign. No general principle of international law prevents a riparian
State from excluding foreign ships from the navigation of such a river or
from diverting or polluting its water.44

Professor Kliiber concurs by observing:
[T]he independence of States is particularly marked in the free and exclusive use of their right over the whole extent of the waters [in their territory].
A State ... is entitled to exploit its territory to achieve its proper objects
... by ... changing the course of waterways, even if that might turn out
to be to the detriment of other States.45

To a measured extent publicists who have maintained that there is no
international law of rivers have lent unwitting support to the doctrine of
absolute sovereign rights; in the absence of a positive set of rules apportioning the use of a river, one must more or less fall back upon the natural
advantage a small state derives from its location on a river, limited only by
considerations of power politics.
The doctrine is honored more with opposition46 than support, however,
and probably does not describe any international law today. American practice has abandoned the Harmon Doctrine. The Treaty With Mexico (Feb.
3, 1944) regulating rights in the Colorado, Tijuana, and Rio Grande Rivers
expressly acknowledged the "common interest" and the protection of the
42 See The RepOf't of American Section of the Int'l. Water Comm., H.R. Doc. No. 359,
7Ist Cong., 2d Sess. (1930).
43 Sw:SARIAN, TBE DivERsioN oF lNTERNA'IlONAL RivERs 71 (1939).
-"BRIGGs, Tlm LAw OF NAnoNs 274 (2d ed.1952).
45 ECE REPORT 52.
46 See, e.g., Griffin, The Use of Waters of International Drainage Basins Under CustOfiUJI"Y
International Law, 53 AM.. J. lNT'L L. SO, 69 (1959~. Austin, supra note 38, at 407, bluntly
states: " .•. Whatever merit [Attorney General Harmon's] argum-mt may have as an exercise
in logic it has no relation to common sense."
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existing uses of both parties/7 and a legal advisor of the State Department
was explicit and vigorous in personally repudiating the doctrine.48 Certainly
with respect to rivers the headwaters of which are not within American territory, our position has been quite different from that of the Harmon Doctrine. Thus, in negotiating the use of the Columbia River with Canada the
United States has asserted that Canada is not free to utilize the river so as
to jeopardize existing uses or projects on the American side.49
The bulk of the international publicists oppose the doctrine of absolute
sovereign rights on grounds aptly stated by H. A. Smith, who has done the
most extensive writing on this subject: "[The doctrine of absolute supremacy of the territorial sovereign] is ... essentially anarchic ... permit[ting]
every state to inflict irreparable injury upon its neighbours without being
amenable to any control save the threat of war .1150 More significantly, the
doctrine of absolute sovereignty finds virtually no support within our federal system nor, indeed, could it be appropriate to the settlement of interstate water disputes among federal entities constitutionally inhibited from
pursuing their own ends with indifference to the interests of others.51 If
applied literally to interstate disputes, the rigorous application of this doctrine would oblige the Supreme Court to abandon to the quasi-sovereign
states the means of apportioning vital rivers according to geographic advantage and practical ability to divert water away from each other, regardless of the social consequences to the nation. This is hardly a likely prospect.

B. That No State Can Use the Water of a Communal River in a Manner
Which Substantially Affects Other States Without Their Prior Consent
It seems safe ••. to state as a general principle of international law that,
while each state bas sovereign control within its own boundaries, in so far
47See particularly articles 8 and 9. 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994 (effective Nov. 8, 1945).
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Treaty With Mexico Relating to the Utilization of the Waters of Certain Rivers, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5 at 1738-55
(1945). See also pt. I at 19-21. The Treaty elsewhere provided for dams to insure the continuance of existing uses. Timm, Water Treaty Between the United States and Mexico, 10 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 282 (1944). See Austin, supra note 38 at 407, suggesting that article 7 of the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 flatly contradicts Harmon's thesis.
49 The United States Position-Diversion of Columbia River Waters, in PACIFlC NoRTHWEST REGlONAL MEETING OF TBE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1956). See particularly the respective remarks of Hutcheson, Sherwood, Jorden, and Bourne, at 21, 35, 16-18.
150 SMITH 144-45.
Ill Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 143 (1902): "But when one of our States complains
of the infliction of such wrong or the deprivation of such rights by another State, how shall
the existence of cause of complaint be ascertained, and be accommodated if well founded?
The States of this Union cannot make war upon each other. They cannot 'grant letters of
marque and reprisal.' They cannot make reprisal on each other by embargo. They cannot enter
upon diplomatic relations and make treaties.'' See also Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S.
(12 Peters) 657, 726 (1838); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
48 Hearings
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as international rivers are concerned, a state may not exercise that control
without taking into account the effects upon other ripru.ian states. This is a
negative statement which I can as confidently put into positive form in the
old maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.52

This limited principle of international law has gathered authoritative
support among publicists, conventions, cases, and our own federal practice.
With respect to international law publicists, the following expressions are
on point. In The Economic Uses of International Rivers, Professor Smith
states:
Where any proposed employment of waters by one state threatens to injure
the legitimate and vital interests of another, the latter is justified in offering an absolute opposition to the employment proposed ••.•
No state is justified in taking unilateral action to use tlm waters of an
international river in any manner which causes or threatens appreciable
injury to the lawful interests of any other riparian state.53

In his Treatise on International Law, Professor Hall has observed:
Obstruction or diversion of the flow of a river by an upper riparian State
to the prejudice of a lower is alleged to be forbidden on the principle that
'no State is allowed to alter the natural conditions of its own territory to
the disadvantage of the natural conditions of the territory of a neighbouring state', and the same principle applies to the use of the river so as to
cause danger to a lower riparian State.54

In an article which surveyed the municipal law of Germany, France, Switzerland, Italy, and the United States, Professor Sauser-Hall stated:
[N] o diversion of a stream which is of a character to strongly prejudice
other riparians or communities whose territories are bordered by or traversed by the same stream [is permissible]. ~ 5

Professor Oppenheim, adverting again to the catchliues of tort law, main·
tained:
[A]n abuse of a right enjoyed by virtue of International Law ... occurs
when a State avails itself of its right in an arbitrary manner in such a way
as to inflict upon another State an injury which cannot be justified by a
legitimate consideration of its own advantage .... The maxim, sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas . . . is one of those general principles of law
recognized by civilised States which the Permanent Court is bound to
apply by virtue of Article 38 of its Statute.56
52 Eagleton, The Use of the Waters of International Rivers, 33 Ct.N. B. REv. 1018, 1021
(1955).
53 SMITll 151.
MHAu., TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (8th ed. 1924),
55 L'Utilisation IndustrieUe des Fleuves Internationaux, 83 Rl:cuEIL DES CouRS 470, 517
(1953). (Author's translation from the French.)
~61 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 345-47 (8th ed. 1955).
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The same principle recurs in the writings of Brierly,07 Cardona,58 Baty,09
and Kaekenbeeck.60
Of recent vintage are the resolutions of international associations and
conferences. Such material may reasonably be considered as once removed
from the authority of "highly qualified publicists," although it probably
comes closer to this source of law than to any other allowed by article 38
of the International Court Statute. And as expressions of aspiration by unofficial representatives from a considerable number of countries, these resolutions are not without value. In 19 56 the Dubrovnick Conference attended
by members of the International Law Association passed the following
resolutions, among others:
III. While each state has sovereign control over the international rivers
within its own boundaries, the state must exercise this control with due
consideratioi_J. for its effects upon other riparian states.
IV. A state is responsible, under international law, for public or private
acts producing change in the existing regime of a river to the injury of
another state, which it could have prevented by reasonable diligence.
VI. A state which proposes new works ... or change of previously existing
use of water wh'ich might affect utilization of the water by another state
must first consult with the other state.61
In 19 57 the plenary session of the Inter-American Bar Association resolved
that the following principles, among others, form part of "existing international law'':
1. Every state having under its jurisdiction a part of a system of international waters, has the right to make use of the waters thereof insofar
as such use does not affect adversely the equal right of the states having
under their jurisdiction other parts of the system.

3. States having under their jurisdiction part of a system of international waters are under a duty to refrain from making changes in the existing regime that might affect adversely the advantageous use by one or
more other states having a part of the system under their jurisdiction except
in accordance with: (i) an agreement with the state or states affected or
(ii) a decision of an international court or arbitral commission.62
ed. 1955).
Regimen Juridico de los Rios Internacionales, 56 REVISTA DE DERECHO INTERNA-

57 BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 205 (5th

158 El

ClONAL 24, La Habana, No.lll (1949).
59 BATY, Tm: CANONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (1930).
60 KAECKEN1!EECK, INTERNATIONAL RivERs 181 (1918).
61 Principles of Law Governing the Uses of International Rivers, in REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAw AssOCIATION CoNFERENCE (1956) [hereinafter cited as !L.A. REPORT].
62 REsoLUTIONS oF Tm: TENTH CoNFERENCE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION

No.4 (1957).
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In 1952 the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe concluded a study on the development of hydro-electric power in Europe. While
disavowing any principles purporting to represent settled international law,
it stated that "most authorities" claim that states enjoy a limited sovereignty over communal waters, but that as soon as "serious injury" may
be caused to another state, the consent of the affected state must be obtained.63 At another point, the Report of the Commission justifies the prerequisite of consent as a necessary means of respecting the absolute sovereignty of riparian states, rather than as a manifestation of the sic utere
principle:
[The fact that compromises have been reached does not impair the absolute sovereignty of States, but] ••• on the contrary, ••• resolves itself
into the consent which the State may give for the execution of the works,
and finds expression in the agreement . . ..
A State has the right to develop unilaterally that section of the waterway which traverses or borders its territory, insofar as !ruch development is
liable to cause 1n the territory of another State, only slight injury or minor
inconvenience compatible with good neighbourly relations.
On the other hand, when the injury liable to be caused is serious and
lasting, development works may only be undertaken under a prior agree
ment.64
4

As to what constitutes "serious injury," the ECE, unhappily, declined to
specify. The suggestion of the ECE that trivial injuries to other states do
not genuinely impugn their sovereignty or require their prior consent dovetails with the Madrid Declarations of 1911 (a source of international fluvial law cited with only slightly less frequency than the magnum opus of
H. A. Smith):
.
I. [N]e1ther State may, on its own territory, utilize or allow the utilization
of the water in such a way as seriously to interfere with its utilization by
the other State or by individuals, corporations, etc., thereof.
II. When a stream traverses successively the territories of two or more
States:
1. The point where this stream crosses the frontiers of two States,
whether naturally, or since time immemorial, may not be changed by establishments of one of the States without the consent of the other.

3. No establishment (especially factories utilizing hydraulic power)
may take so much water that the constitution, otherWise called the utilisable or essential character of the stream, shall, when it reaches the territory
downstream, be seriously modified.ell

63 ECE REPORT 61.
64Jd. at 209-11. See also Sikri co=ents in the IL.A. REPoRT 8.
65 24lNsriruT DE DRoiT lim:RNATIONAL A.NNuAIRE 170 (1911); SMITH 156; ECE REPORT
261. (Emphasis added.)

1960]

INTERNATIONAL LAW

609

Let us now turn briefly to a consideration of the judicial and quasijudicial support for the principle that international law requires the prior
consent of affected parties to sanction the use of a river which may adversely affect them. In 1939, the Italian Court of Cassation attempted to clarify
the mutual interest of France and Italy in the Roya River with the following observations:
International law recognizes the right on the part of every riparian State
to enjoy, as a participant of a kind of partnership created by the river, all
the advantages deriving from it for the purpose of securing the welfare and
the economic and civil progress of the nation ....
However, although a State in the exercise of its right of sovereignty, may
subject public rivers to whatever regime it deems best, it cannot disregard
the international duty, derived from that principle, not to impede or to
destroy, as a result of this regime, the opportunity of the other States to
avail themselves of the flow of water for their own national needs. 66

The implication is, therefore, that some mutually satisfactory agreement
must be reached before use of a river can be made by one sovereign where
such use would adversely affect another.
In 192 7 the Deutsches Staatsgerichtshof adjudicated a dispute between
Wurttemberg, Prussia, and Baden concerning use of the Danube River.
Wurttemberg and Prussia had protested the diminished flow of the Danube
through Wurttemberg. The court indicated that "general principles of
international law concerning the flow of international rivers" would support the sic utere principle:
[E] very State is subject to limitations based on general principles of international law precluding it from infringing the rights of another member of
the international community. No State has the right to cause substantial
injury to the interests of another State by the use it makes of the waters of
a natural waterway.67

In 1892 British authorities apportioned the use of thirteen rivers traversing Madras and Mysore according to the proposition that the upper
riparian could proceed with certain irrigation projects only after obtaining
the prior consent of the affected lower riparian. The agreement,fell short
of giving the lower riparian a veto power, however, in providing that consent could be withheld only in the interest of protecting certain existing
rights in the river. 68
66 Societe :Energie Electrique du Littoral Mediterraneen v. Compagnia Imprese Elettriche
Liquri, in the Italian Court of Cassation, Feb. 13, 1939, reported in LAUTERPACHT, ANNUAL
DIGEST OF PuBLIC !Nn:RNATIONAL LAw CASEs No. 47, at 121 (1938-40).
67 ANNuAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw CASES 128 (Lauterpacht ed. 1927-28).
68 Salient passages are reproduced and discussed in the Note on Sikri comments, in the
I.L.A. REPORT S-6.
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In 1856, preceding settlement by treaty, Dutch ministers were instructed to regard Dutch rights in the Meuse River common to Holland
and Belgium in light of the following statement of principle:
The Meuse being a river common both to Holland and to Belgium, it goes
without saying that both parties are entitled to make the natural use of the
stream, but at the same time, following general principles of law, each is
bound to abstain from any action which might cause damage to the other.
In other words, they cannot be allowed to make themselves masters of the
water by diverting it to serve their own needs, whether for purposes of
navigation or of irrigation.69

The statement is of interest not only because it appears to support a broad
sic utere principle, but also because it may mark the earliest appeal to
principles of law as a means of governing the use of communal rivers.70
Nearly one hundred years later the same theme has been echoed. Speaking
before the United Nations Security Council in 1953, the Syrian delegate
stated his understanding of principles which must govern use of the Jordan
River common to Syria and Israel, expanding the sic utere principle into a
doctrine of prior consent: "There is no doubt whatever that in this case a
mutual prior agreement for the use of the waters is necessary before any
project can be started in connexion with them.m1
As might reasonably be expected, the doctrine of prior consent is reinforced by widespread treaty practice.72 The explanation for its incidence
here rests upon the prospective nature of many treaties, attempting as they
frequently do to fix general rules which will control the future conduct of
the signatory states with respect to subjects of mutual interest, rather than
focusing upon the settlement of existing disputes or past wrongs. The principle that the use of communal water which substantially affects other
states requires their prior consent is well designed to head off unilateral
exploitation of international rivers which might otherwise "involve states
in an unwelcome test of power and in an undesirable, abrasive relationship.
What the prior consent doctrine may imply, however, by way of remedy
against a state which ignores it and whether such a remedy is practically
available in American interstate suits must be considered hereafter. The
following treaties are offered as examples of the inclusion of the doctrine
of prior consent in treaties between nations:
69SMITH 217.
70 I d. at 136.

71 UN. SECURITY CouNCIL OFF. REc. 8th year, 649th Meeting 21 (S/PV.649) (1953).
See also I.L.A. REFoRT 26-27.
72H.A. Smith, The Chicago Diversion, 8 CAN. B. REv. 330,335 (1930): "Taken as a whole
••. treaties proceed upon the principle that works executed in the territory of A require the
consent of B if they injuriously affect his interests. In general they indicate a tendency to incorporate this principle in the conventional law of nations."
On the significance of multilateral conventions, see BISHOP, !Nn:RNATIONAL LAW CASES 24
(1953).
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1. Treaty Between the Netherlands and Prussia, 1816
One of the earliest international river treaties on point was this treaty
signed at Aix-la-Chapelle on June 26, 1816, fixing frontiers between the
Netherlands and Prussia. With respect to future use of certain frontier
rivers, it provided: "[Neither State] shall make any alteration whatever
in the course of the rivers or in the actual banks of the rivers, nor grant
any concession or diversion of water, without the consent and agreement
of the two Governments.m3
2. Treaty Between Belgium and Holland, 1843
Signed at Maestricht on August 8, 1843, this treaty fixed the conditions
for the prospective use of several rivers in determining the frontier between
Belgium and Holland: "No new use of water, no concession or innovation
whatsoever, entailing some modification of the rivers or other boundary
watercourses, or to the present condition of the banks, can be admitted
without the consent of the two Governments.m4
3. Treaty Between Sweden and Norway, 1905 (Treaty of Karlstadt)
Signed at Stockholm on October 26, 1905, the Treaty of Karlstadt severed the two countries. It provided, generally, for the regulation of communal lakes and watercourses and is notable for resting the prior consent
doctrine on general principles of international law:
Article IT: Conforming to general principles of :international law, it is understood that works mentioned in Article I, (re communal lakes and rivers),
shall not be executed in one of the two States without the consent of the
other, every time that these works, in affecting the water situated in the
other State, sensibly hinder the use of the water course for navigation or
the floating of logs, or otherWise effect serious changes in the water over a
considerable area.7G

4. Treaty Between France and Italy, 1914
Signed in Paris on December 17, 1914, and previously referred to in
our discussion of cases,76 this treaty strongly supports the prior consent
doctrine in the prospective use of the international Roya River:
Article I: The high contracting parties mutually bind themselves not to
exploit, or to permit the exploitation of the hydraulic force of the Roya or
its tributaries, on the side of the river exclusively subject to their sovereignty, 'in any manner which wm be of a nature to sensibly modify the
regime or the method of natural flow of the water in the lower state.
Article IT: The ..• parties mutually recognize their equal rights to the
water and descent of the Roya and of its tributaries, in all the parts where
this river course forms the frontier between France and Italy. In conse733 BR. ST. P. 720, 729 (1838). (Author's translation from the French.)
7-i35 BR. ST. P. 1202 (1860). (Author's translation from the French.)
76 98 BR. ST. P. 828, 829 (1905). (Author's translation from the French.) See also
FAUCHILLE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 498-99 (1925).
76 See text at note 66 supra.
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quence, each' of the two States declares its inability, on its own territory, to
utilize or to permit the utilization of the water in a manner which causes
injury to the equal right of utilization by the other State on the other side,
without the consent of that State.77
Article III: No works are to be constructed along the banks of the frontier
stretches without the consent of the other party.78

5. Treaty Between France and the Netherlands, 1915
Signed September 30, 1915, this Convention limited use of the Maroni
River which formed the boundary between French Guiana and Dutch Surinam in South America:
Article III: No works, whether for purposes of public or private utility, are
to be constructed in the frontier section of the river, such as to be capable
of constituting an obstacle to navigation or of modifying the nature of the
river, except by consent of both parties.79

6. Treaty Between Finland and Russia, 1922
Signed at Helsingfors on October 28, 1922, this agreement applied to
the vast network of frontier watercourses between the two countries:
"Waters may not be diverted from the watercourses .•• unless a special
agreement has been concluded in each case between the Contracting
States."80
Similar agreements with fully analogous provisions have been promulgated among the following nations: France and Switzerland; 81 Finland and
Norway; 82 Germany and France; 83 South Africa and Portugal; 84 Great
Britain and Belgium; 85 the United Kingdom and the United States; 86 the
United Kingdom and Brazil; 87 and Costa Rica and Panama.88 Further
77108 BR. ST. P. 467-68 (1914). (Author's translation from the French.)
78 See the appendix in SMITH at 179.
79110 BR. ST. P. 872 (1916). (Author's translation from the French.) See also SMITH 181.
8019 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIES 1931 194-95 [hereinafter cited as LN.T.S.].
81110 BR. ST. P. 886.
82122 BR. ST. P. 530 (1925}. See particularly art. I: "In the river systems of the Pasvik
and the Jakobselv, no measure shall be taken on the territory of one of the contracting States
which causes a change in the natural reginle of the waters at their lowest point, to the detriment of the other State, without its consent." (Author's translation from the French.)
83 75 LN.T.S. 264, 268.
84}23 BR. ST. P. 593 (1926}.
85139 BR. ST. P. 746 (1934). For !;upport of the sic utere principle, see articles I, 4, 6,
and 10.
86 See article XI of the Treaty of 1925, governing diversions from the Lake of the Woods.
44 Stat. 2108, T.S. No. 721 (effective July 17, 1925}. See also Convention with Canada Respecting Emergency Regulation of Rainy Lake, Sept. 15, 1938, 54 Stat. 1800 (effective Oct.
18, 1940}.
87 See ECE REPORT 149: [A]ny work such as canalization, irrigation, or the development
of electrical power shall only be undertaken subject to the mutual consent of both riparian
States."
88144 BR. ST. P. 751 (1941). See particularly art. 5: "Any work either one of the two
countries may desire to undertake on the rivers marking the frontier line must be approved,
in anticipation, by the other party."
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support for the prior consent doctrine is found in the coerced Treaty of
Peace of 1919, signed at Versailles by the Allied and Associated Powers
with Germany, which provided:
Article 359: Subject to the preceding provisions (which secured certain
extraordinary rights to France for exploitation of the Rhine River), no
works shall be carried out in the bed on either bank of the Rhine where it
forms the boundary of France and Germany without the previous approval
of the Central Commission or of its agents.89

Also, in the Treaty of Peace of 1919, signed by the Allied and Associated
Powers and Bulgaria at Neuilly-sur-Seine, the use of international rivers
for irrigation purposes was stipulated to have priority over navigation interests only "with the consent of all the riparian states represented on the
International Commission.ll9°
A Convention signed at Barcelona on April 20, 1921, acceded to by
more than twenty small countries and ratified by Italy, Denmark, Bulgaria,
Albania, India, New Zealand, and the British Empire, tends to establish
the prior consent doctrine as a "general principle of law recognized by
civilized nations":
It is understood, however, that [certain uses of international rivers] ...
cannot be undertaken [by a riparian state] so long as the State on the territory of which they are to be carried out objects on the ground of vital
interests.91

Since scarcely any of the signatory states have any rivers in common, however, the Convention is deprived of much practical significance. Moreover,
the requirement of prior consent appears to be limited to those uses to be
carried out within the territory of another state and may not obtain where
the injury or interference with sovereign territory would be indirect.
More significant, perhaps, is the Convention among Great Britain, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany and Italy of 1922, instituting the
Statute of Navigation of the Elbe. Here the geographic proximity of some
of the signatory states is most meaningful:
Save where there is reasonable ground of opposition on the part of one of
the riparian States, founded ... upon ... needs of irrigation ... or the
need for the construction of other and more advantageous means of communication, a riparian State may not refuse to execute the works included
in the said programme on condition that is not bound to assume a direct
share of the expenses.92
89 BRITISH TREATY SERIES No.4, at 1 (1919) [hereinater cited as BR. T.S.].
90BR. T.S. No.5, at 781 (1920).
91 BR. T. S. No. 28, art. 9(3) (1923).
92 26 LN.T.S. 219, 239; BR. T. S. No. 3 (1923). Translation of article 43 in SMITH, ap-
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Ostensibly, this Convention is antagonistic to the prior consent doctrine,
but in reserving to each state its right to reject a proposed use of communal
rivers on the ground of injury to vital interests and in failing to provide for
any means of testing the reasonableness of such an objection, the Convention adheres to the prior consent doctrine in conferring an absolute veto
right on each state, as H. A. Smith has properly remarked.ea The same veto
is featured in the Convention between Great Britain, Northern Ireland,
New Zealand, Denmark, Greece, Siam, Southern Rhodesia, and Newfoundland signed at Geneva on December 9, 1923, and relating to the Development of Hydraulic Power (along rivers) affecting more th~m one state:
The provisions [relating to reference of disputes to judicial settlement]
shall not be applicable to any State which represents that the development
of hydraulic power would be seriously detrimental to its national economy
or security.94

As a final item in this chronology of treaties and conventions, attention
should be drawn to the Declaration of the Seventh International Conference of American States (1933). A salient passage provides:
[N] o State may, without the consent of the other riparian State, introduce
into water courses of an international character, for the industrial or agricultural exploitation of their waters, any alteration which may prove injurious to the margin of the other interested State.95

These, then, are the authorities which support concepts of international
law which may reasonably be brought within the general principle or doctrine of prior consent. In its mildest aspect, as an avatar of the sic utere
maxim, the principle may mean ouly that a state must develop its water
resources with due regard for the interests of other states-a proposition
which is more platitudinous than helpful as it leaves unanswered the following questions: What degree of interest must another state establish to
forestall injury by a state which subsequently wishes to exploit the river?
Should competing interests be weighed and a decision rendered in favor of
the state with "superior" interests? Should proof of :mticipated "substantial" injury to one state forever foreclose a particular use of the river by
another? Is some ultimate agreement apportioning use of a river mandatory? And, not the least significant, who shall decide these issues? International publicists have proffered no answers, treaties offer us little assistance, and the oceasional cases touching the sic uteYe principle are not on
point. In this posture, we are obliged to concede that the notion of sic utere
tuo ut alienam non kzedas is largely an aspiration of international jurisprudence which encourages states to anticipate disputes and to provide for
93 SMITH,

appendix at 194.

94 Article 12, 36 LN.T.S. 76, 81; BR. T. S.
95 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 59 (Supp.) (1934).

No. 26 (1925).
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them by treaty and which deals with a subject which might otherwise be
settled only through power politics. At best, currency of the sic utere notion
negatives the assertion of an absolute sovereign right to make uninhibited
use of all waters within a state's territory and may, in prospect, provide for
the peaceful apportionment of international rivers through negotiation.
In its more stringent aspect the principle of prior consent means that
a state cannot use an international river in any capacity where such a use
would affect the river's suitability for use by any other state without first
obtaining the prior consent of all states so affected. The principle is, in this
view, an unequivocal interdict against unilateral appropriations, and one
would suppose that a tribunal deciding a dispute under this doctrine would
require the undoing of state projects constructed without the permission of
affected states or would award damages to the full extent that the affected
states were prejudiced; its decision would be unaffected by other considerations, and it would not weigh the needs which impelled the offending state
to use the river nor would it consider the unreasonableness of the affected
states in withholding their consent to that use as long as they could show
some injury. It purports to confer an absolute veto on each state, paying
full tribute to the negative virtues of sovereignty; 116 but as a forceful inducement to states to negotiate their differences and to anticipate their
needs by treaty, the doctrine of prior consent is not without merit. Moreover, it is in many respects consonant with international law which commonly seeks the protection of the sovereign independence of nations by a
matrix of negative rules and prohibitions. This emphasis on the protection
of sovereignty is, perhaps, the hallmark of international law. The law of
nations, in the main, is derived from the consent of states which are naturally jealous of their own "vital interests;" the law seeks to insulate smaller
states from the incursions and pressures of larger, self-aggrandizing states,
and it attempts to avoid sanctioning conduct giving rise to disputes unlikely to be settled by peaceful means. But the doctrine of prior consent
effects these aims at the risk of cutting off the fruitful use of international
rivers among states obstinately hostile to any use which might work to
their own slight disadvantage.
Moreover, considerations which support the doctrine in international
politics do not obtain within our own federal system, and so its acceptance
by the Supreme Court is both unlikely and unwarranted. In contrast to the
international community, our federal political subdivisions can be controlled by laws not promulgated by their own loeallegislatures, as each has
relinquished a large measure of its sovereignty to Congress and the Union.
Quite obviously, too, the settlement of disputes by means of war is not a
real prospect which should fignre in arriving at principles to govern the
96

See SMITH 147, 151, 156. See also 1

REPORT OF TBE

INDus

CoMMISSION

54 (1950).
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apportionment of interstate rivers. To the extent that the doctrine of prior
consent is useful in adjudicating interstate cases, it should therefore be accepted merely as one consideration among several; perhaps it is not unfair
that where a state has made no attempt to consider the interests of its quasisovereign neighbors and has promoted its own interests in cavalier disregard of the welfare of adjoining states, the principle of prior consent affords
a reasonable basis for the Supreme Court to require a tailoring of such
projects to maximize the use of a river for all the parties concerned, including the nation-at-large. This suggests that the prior consent of affected
riparian states ought not to be controlling, although it is relevant depending upon the extent of the affected state's interest and the reasonableness
of its refusal as measured by the extent of probable injury.

C. That Waters of a Communal River Must be Equitably Apportioned
According to a Number of Relevant Considerations
[E]very river system is naturally an indivisible physical umt, and as such
it should be so developed as to render the greatest poHsible service to the
whole human community which it serves, whetl!er or not that community
is divided into two or more political jurisdictions.97

This general philosophy is supported not only by a convincing number
of international publicists,98 treaties,99 and cases/00 but corresponds to the
doctrine of equitable apportionment purportedly followed in the American
cases as well.101 As the Supreme Court stated in Connecticut v. Massachusetts:
97 SMITH 15D-51.
98 See, e.g., Principles· of Law Governing the Uses of Internatiotwl Rivers, No. V, I.L.A.
REPoRT at 4; REsoLUTIONs OF THE TENTH CoNFERENCE OF THE INTER-A:M:EluCAN BAR AsSOCIATION No. 2 of Committee I at 78 (1957); Eagleton, The Use of the Waters of International
Rivers, 33 CAN. B. REv. 1018, 1021-23 (1955) ; SMITH at 151; Cardona, El Regimen Juridico
de los Rios lnternacionales, 56 REVISTA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 24, 26 La Habana, No. 111
(1949); Quint, in ECE REPORT at 60; Andrassy, Le Droit Intel71ational De Voisinage, II
RECUEIL DES CoURS 119-21 {1921); Griffin, Legal Aspects of the Use of Systems of Internatiotwl Waters, U.S. Cong. Doc. No. 118, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1958); Bourne, PACIFIC
NORTHWEST REGULAR MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (1956).
99See, e.g., Franco-Hispanic Treaty of 1866, arts. IX and X, 56 BR. ST. P. 212, 226;
Treaty With Mexico, Nov. 14, 1944, art. 8, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 690 (effective Nov. 8, 1945);
Treaty With Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and
Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VIII, 36 Stat. 2448 (effective May 13, 1910); Franco-Turkish
Treaty of 1921, art. 12, 114 BR. ST. P. 771 (1921) (commented on by Hirsch in 50 AM.. J. INT'L
L. 81, 88 (1956)); Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern, art. 6, Br. T.S.
No. 28 (1923); Convention of 1923, art. 2, 36 LN.T.S. 76, 81; Franco-Turkish Protocol of
1930, translated by Hirsch in 50 AM.. J. lNT'L L. 81, 86 (1956) from the Rapport a 1a Societe
des Nations sur Ia situation de Ia Syrie et du Liban, Annee 1930, at 177.
100 See, e.g., 1 REPORT oF THE INDus CoMMISSION 1D-13 (1950): "It follows from (these
p~ciples) that the rights of the several units concerned in this dispute must be determined
by applying neither the doctrine of sovereignty, nor the doctrine of riparian rights, but the rule
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[D] isputes [over interstate rivers] are to be settled on the basis of equality
of right. But this is not to say that there must be an equal division of the
waters of an interstate stream among the States through which it flows. It
means that the principles of right and equity shall be applied having regard
to the "equal level or plane on which all the States stand, in point of power
and right, under our constitutional system" and that, upon a consideration
of the pertinent laws of the contending States and all other relevant facts
this Court will determine what is an equitable apportionment of the use of
such waters.102

The signal difficulty with the doctrine of equitable apportionment is,
however, that the same platitudinous quality which makes it so agreeable
also makes it disturbingly vague and uncertain. All parties are assured that
a tribunal will treat their interests "fairly," without the mechanical application of a rigid rule, but none can anticipate from this alone precisely how
safe they will be in appropriating the use of a communal river. As a bald
proposition, equitable apportionment merely negatives or mitigates the two
principles previously discussed, i.e., the doctrines of absolute sovereignty
and prior consent.
There is, however, some authority which may give this principle a certain clarity on at least two points, the latter one being of considerable significanc~. Although the occasion would be rare when two states or nations
were planning fluvial diversions at the same moment, the notion of equitable
apportionment has been spelled out in recognizing a preference for certain
kinds of uses. Thus, diversions for domestic purposes assume priority over
those for industrial or agricultural purposes/03 and the construction of
of 'equitable apportionment,' each unit being entitled to a fair share of the waters of the Indus
and its tributaries."
The Donauversinkung Case, ANNuAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw CAsEs 128
(Lauterpacht ed.1927-28): "[A]n attempt must be made to apportion or measure the respective interests in an equitable manner, balancing the advantages gained by one state against the
injury, or possible injury, caused to another." The case is discussed in SMITH 54; SIMSARIAN,
DIVERSION OF INTERNATIONAL RivERS 93-95 (1939). The original report is found in 116 Entscheidungen des Reichgerichts in Zivilsacben 18 (Ger.).
The Leitha River Case, reported in 1 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 595
(1940): "[W]e have not passed beyond the postulate of the mutual and fair consideration of
the contiguous states through which the river takes its course ...."
See also the case of Aargau v. Zurich, Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts
aus dem Jahre 1878 (Jan. 12, 1878), noted by Schindler, The Administration of Justice in the
Swiss Federal Court in Intercantonal Disputes, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 149, 169-72 (1921).
101 See Austin, A Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 CAN. B.
REv. 393, 433-34 (1959), and cases cited therein.
102 282 u.s. 660, 67o-71 (1931).
103 Treaty With Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VIII, 36 Stat. 2448 (effective May 13, 1910); Treaty With
Mexico, Nov. 14, 1944, art. III, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994 (Nov. 8, 1945); REPoRT OF THE
INDUS Co:M:MISSION 11 (1950). But see !L.A. REPORT 4; Hirsch, UtiliziJtion of International
Rivers in the Middle East, 50 AM.J.INT'LL.99 (1956): "No priority categories of water use
exist in Middle East conventional law, such as exist in European and American international
agreements ...."
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canals to divert previously unused portions of a river to supply municipal
water systems is to be preferred if the river is not sufficient also to support
irrigation canals. The same common sense attitude generally prefers agricultural uses over recreational uses for hunting and fishing. 104 Some qualitative distinctions among uses, therefore, do exist to assure a state of the
propriety of its diversion in advance, as evidenced by international customary law.
The more serious question arises, however, where one state initiates a
use of a certain kind without the consent of other riparians and is subsequently confronted with their demand that water committed to this preexisting use must now be released for their own projects of the same or a
"preferred" nature. Specifically, the issue has arisen in disputes involving
right in communal rivers for irrigation purposes, and the question is what
weight will be given to a pre-existing project or use.
The answer which seems to be emerging is that the prior appropriawr

will enjoy a superior right in the absence of a showing of extreme hardship
to adversely affected parties. In an address before the Inter-American Bar
Association in 1957, John Laylin asserted this principle most vigorously:
As a rule, the protection of uses, lawful when they came into existence, so
long as they remain benefidal, has been treated as an absolute first charge
upon the waters.

In less favored regions, not only are existing uses protected, but as between
existing uses those first established ordinarily enjoy a priority over uses
established later•105

The rapporteur for the Institute de Droit International, Professor Andrassy of the University of Zagreb, Yugoslavia, concurs with the following
illustration:
Certain developments and constructions have taken place before the conflict of interest and the necessity for regulation made themselves felt. In
such a case, one applies the prindple of acquired rights. The priority of the
existing fact is respected, since needs have already been adapted to those
possibilities created by this previous construction.1oa
104 See, e.g., Treaty With Mexico, Nov. 14, 1944, art. ill, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994
(Nov. 8, 1945). The priority of navigational uses, in contrast, is not uniformly agreed upon,
some ranking it second to domestic use (REPORT OF THE INDus Coli!MISSION 11) Treaty With
Great Britain, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VIII, 36 Stat. 2448 (effective May 13, 1910)), others ranking
it after industrial and agricultural uses; Treaty With Mexico, Nov. 14, 1944, art. III, 59 Stat.
1219, T.S. No. 994 (Nov. 8, 1945); remarks of Laylin, Principles of Law Governing Use of
International Rivers, in INTER-.AUERICAN BAR AssociATION CONFEF.ENCE 146 (1957).
105 INTER-AYERicAN BAR AssOCIATION CONFERENCE, PRINCIPLES OF I,Aw GoVERNING USE
OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERs 63, 68 (1957).
106 Andrassy, Le Droit International De Voisinage, II REcuEIL DES CouRs 119-21 (1951).
(Author's translation from the French.)
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Indeed, as early as 1858 Vattel identified actual appropriation of communal waters as a sovereign act sufficient to establish an enduring, legitimate claim:
[T]he nation that first estabHshed her dominion on one of the banks of
the river is considered as being the first possessor of all that part of the
river which bounds her territory.
If that nation has made any use of the river, as, for navigating or fishing, it is presumed with greatest certainty that she has resolved to appropriate the river to her own use.107

Also, in a State Department memorandum prepared by the Office of the
Legal Advisor, high priority for what is "just and reasonable" is given to
"established lawful and beneficial uses" even in preference to a "comparison of the economic and social gains accruing from the various possible
uses .... to the entire area dependent upon the waters in question.moa The
statement is consistent with the position taken by Mr. Len Jordan, Chairman of the United States Section of the International Joint Commission,
who has argued against proposed Canadian diversions from the Columbia
River by relying on "substantial investments in existing power plants"
already undertaken by the United States.m09
The 1956 Conference of the International Law Association suggested
that the following considerations are relevant to the equitable apportionment of communal rivers:
(a) the right of each [state] to a reasonale use of the water;
(b) the extent of the dependence of each state upon the waters of
that river;
(c) the comparative social and economic gains accruing to each and
to the entire river community;
(d) pre-existing agreements among _the states concerned; and
(e) pre-existing appropriation of water by one state.
In explaining the comparative weight which might be attached to each
factor, a member of the reporting committee suggested that "an especial
importance attaches to_ existing uses," subordinate only to a prior agreeTm: LAW OF NATIONS 120 {1858).
Griffin, Legal Aspects of the Use of Systems of International Waters, U.S. Cong. Doc.
No. 118, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 {1958).
109 Jordon's statement has been construed as favoring the protection of existing projects
and not merely existing uses, i.e., once preparation for the use of a river has hegun, a right is
established over the use of whatever water is contemplated by the project. See Austin, A Study
of the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 CAN. B. REv. 393, 442 (1959); Remarks of Ladner in The United States Position-Diversion of Columbia River Waters, in
PACIFIC NoRTHWEST REGULAR MEETING oF THE .AMERICAN SOCIETY oF INTERNATIONAL LAw
I
16-17 {1956).
107 VATI"EL,
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ment between the parties which would otherwise form the law to govern
the parties.U0
Treaties dating from 1816 have offered similar support for the rank of
pre-existing uses in determining what constitutes equitable apportionment.
Thus, the Netherlands and Prussia agreed in that year that "established
rights (in frontier rivers) shall continue to be recognized for the benefit of
the same State which presently enjoys them.m11 A treaty between Belgium
and Holland signed in 1843 provided that "uses of water which exist at
this moment on the rivers or other watercourses falling on the frontier shall
be preserved in their present condition.m12 A Convention ratified by Great
Britain, Northern Ireland, New Zealand, Denmark, Greece, Siam, Southern Rhodesia, and Newfoundland in 1923 provided that future power
projects were to be developed "with due regard for any works already existing, under construction, or projected.m13 A Franco-Hispanic Treaty of
1866 provided for the apportionment of frontier waters only after "deduction [was] made for lands already under irrigation." 114 Examples could be
multiplied,115 but it is sufficient to summarize these treaties by stating that
pre-eminent respect for existing uses is reasonably well established within
the framework of equitable apportionment.
Some disagreement has, of course, been registered, 116 and certainly cases
can be imagined where rigorous application of the doctrine of pre-existing
uses would work an intolerable hardship. Thus, if the prior appropriator
were wasting a substantial part of its diversions through excessive absorbtion in unlined canals or only occasional actual use of the total water
diverted, it might lose its priority.117 In another vein, it might be more
equitable to permit subsequent diversion where the later use could be
clearly demonstrated to be more productive or socially beneficial, provided
110IL.A. REPORT at p.4 of the First Report of the Committee on the Uses of the Waters
of International Rivers, and at p. 12 of Laylin's Comments.
111 3 BR. ST. P. 720 {1838). (Author's translation from the French.)
112 Art. 37, 35 BR. ST. P. 1202 (1860). (Author's translation from the French.)
113 Art. 2, 36 LN.T.S. 76, 81; BR. T.S. No. 26 (1925).
114 Art. X, 56 BR. ST. P. 212, 226 (1866). (Author's translation from the French.)
115 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE !NI>US COMMISSION lQ-11 (1950); "In the general interest of
the entire community inhabiting dry, arid territories, priority may usually have to be given
to an earHer irrigation project over a later one: 'priority of appropriation gives superiority of
right'"; UN. SEcUIUTY CoUNcn OFF. REc. 8th year, 649th Meeting 21 (S/PV.649) (1953)
(remarks of Syrian delegate); Convention between Persia and Russia, art. IV, 73 BR. ST. P.
97 (1882); Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Treaty With Mexico
Relating to the Utilization of the Waters of Certain Rivers, 79Ul Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
19-21 (1945)
116 See, e.g., remarks of Ladner in The United States Position-Diversion of Columbia
River Waters, in PACIFlC NORTHWEST REGULAR MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 18 (1956). And see authors, at notes 38, 44 and 45 supra, who support the doctrine of absolute sovereignty.
117 See Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1936).
0
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that due compensation were made to the prior appropriator. 118 On these
matters, however, international law is not helpful for there is virtually no
authority which indicates the influence of these competing factors.
CONCLUSION

Bearing in mind that international custom, agreement, or opinion has
not yet developed sufficiently so as comprehensively to spell out a law governing the diversion of communal rivers, a consensus of authority may lean
towards the following propositions:
1. No state enjoys an absolute claim on communal waters by virtue of
its geographic situation alone.
2. The equitable apportionment of international rivers requires in the
first instance an attempt to secure the consent of all states which would be
adversely affected by a proposed use.
3. Such consent may reasonably be withheld where the proposed diversion conflicts with imminent diversions for purposes of higher or eqt,J.al priority, or where the proposed diversion would adversely affect pre-existing
uses of any reasonable kind.
a) Where consent was reasonably withheld, subsequent diversions by
the state which applied for or which should have applied for consent
shall have no influence in determining the outcome of an ensuing
dispute.
b) Where consent was unreasonably withheld, or circumstances clearly
indicate in advance that no state would be presently and adversely
affected by a proposed diversion of communal waters, the use of the
water then diverted for any reasonable purpose shall act to establish
the right of the appropriator to its continued use.
If these propositions are at least suggested by considerations of international law, there is probably even more reason to apply them to interstate
disputes within the United States. First, notions of the absolute integrity
of state sovereignty occupy a lesser importance within our federal system
than they do in the community of nations; rather, we are more properly
concerned that our natural resources be put to use in some capacity which
will benefit a substantial number of people within the nation viewed as a
single community. Thus, there is less reason to apply the doctrine of prior
consent in its most rigorous form by giving to each state im absolute veto
over proposed uses of interstate rivers which might result in a stalemate to
118 For another consideration, see Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945): "But
if an allocation between appropriation States is to be just and equitable, strict adherence to
the priority rule may not be possible. For example, the economy of a region may have been
established on the basis of junior appropriations. So far as possible those established uses should
be protected though strict application of the priority rule might jeopardize them."
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be resolved ouly by congressional action. It would seem better to encourage
the development of our river systems by providing some assurance that
should a state make heavy investments in projects not detrimental to any
existing interest of other states, those projects will not subsequently be disturbed by later claims of others. The doctrine of pre-existing uses seems
well adapted to this end.
Second, and perhaps correlative to the first proposition, there is less of
a need for explicit consent among states of a federation where rules of conduct are otherwise clear than among national states, because of assured
access to judicial authority in case of dispute. Whether national states will
seek friendly recourse to an arbitration commission or to the International
Court is still within their discretion, leaving open the unhappy possibility
of settling a dispute by force or coercion. Thus, international law may be
inclined to favor a rule requiring prior agreement in every case, as a means
of avoiding possible misunderstandings and a resort to force. States within
the United States must settle their differences by lawful means, however,
and thus it is easier to adopt a rule upon which they can rely in anticipation
of judicial support in the event that a dispute does develop. To the extent
that international law may be helpful in the solution of interstate water
disputes, it would seem best for the courts to draw from those principles
which promote rapid development of river systems by assuring the states
that projects undertaken with due regard for others at the time will not
later be upset.

